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Resumen 
 
Es generalmente aceptado que determinados fenómenos metereológicos extremos aconte-
cidos durante las pasadas décadas están conectados con el cambio climático. Algunos de 
estos hechos, como sequías o heladas, afectan a la agricultura haciendo obligada la gestión 
del riesgo. El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar las decisiones de los agricultores respecto 
a la gestión del riesgo, tomando en cuenta la información climática y metereológica. El traba-
jo considera una situación en la que el agricultor, en su gestión de la producción agraria, 
tiene tecnología disponible para proteger la cosecha de los efectos del tiempo meteorológi-
co. Este enfoque ha sido usado por Murphy et al. (1985), Katz and Murphy (1990) y otros en 
el caso de que los agricultores maximicen los beneficios esperados. No obstante, en esta 
ocasión, el modelo introduce un análisis de la actitud hacia al riesgo, de modo que se pueda 
evaluar cómo la decisión óptima es afectada por el coeficiente  de aversión absoluta al ries-
go de Arrow-Pratt; y se pueda al tiempo computar el valor económico de la información en 
semejante contexto. 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Extreme meteorological events have increased over the last decades and it is widely ac-
cepted that it is due to climate change. Some of the extremes, like drought or frost episodes 
largely affect agricultural outputs and risk management becomes crucial. The goal of this 
work it is to analyze farmers’ decisions about risk management, taking into account clima-
tological and meteorological information. 
 
We consider a situation in which the farmer, as part of crop management, has available a 
technology to protect the harvest from weather effects. This approach has been used by 
Murphy et al. (1985), Katz and Murphy (1990) and others in the case that the farmer maxi-
mizes the expected returns. Nevertheless, in our model we introduce the attitude towards 
risk, so we can evaluate how the optimal decision is affected by the absolute risk aversion 
coefficient of Arrow-Pratt, and compute the economic value of the information in this context. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Meteorological information affects agricultural production since it is able to change produc-
ers’ decisions. Many farmers use weather forecasts to manage their activities, taking into 
account some meteorological variables to make better decisions when choosing the planting 
and harvesting time, the application of pesticides, and so on (McNew and Mapp, 1990). 
Cost-Loss analytical models constitute a theoretical approach to decisions under risk which 
are affected by weather. (See Clemen, 1996; Keeney, 1982; Winkler and Murphy, 1985; 
Winkler et al., 1983). 
 
The uncertainty comes from some meteorological variable which depending on the specific 
case produces uncertain consequences. The meteorological forecasts help in the decision 
making alte-ring the conditional probability associated to these events and the economic 
value of these forecasts can be considered as the difference between the expected value 
when an imperfect forecast is available and when just basic information exists there. The 
basic information most commonly accepted is the climatological information. That is, to as-
sume that the agent knows the historical relative frequencies for the meteorological events 
that affect his activity. 
 
What is commonly known as the “Cost-Loss Ratio Situation” model is a particularization of 
prototype decision models, in which an agent must decide between two actions: (i) to protect 
the harvest from an adverse meteorological situation, with a cost C, or (II) not to protect it 
and expose himself to a loss L if the adverse event takes place ( )0 .C L< < < ∞  In the tradi-
tional cost-loss model, in its static version (Thompson, 1952, 1962; Thompson and Brier, 
1955; Murphy, 1977), and also dynamic (Murphy et al., 1985; Katz and Murphy, 1990), an 
essential condition is assumed: the agent presents neutrality to the risk, which means that he 
minimizes the expected expense. 
 
However, agents are sensitive to risk, at least where important decisions are concerned, and 
not taking into consideration this attitude, could lead to wrong conclusions in some cases 
(Wilks, 1997). Accordingly, in Section 2 we propose a model in which the risk attitude has 
been conside-red, and that allows us to evaluate how the optimal decision depends on the 
absolute risk aversion. It is assumed that individual preferences are represented by a CARA 
(Constant Absolute Risk Aversion) utility function. In Section 3 additional meteorological in-
formation is introduced and the economic value of this information is obtained for the risk 
averse agent. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
 
2. Climatological information 
2.1. THE MODEL 
In this section the role of risk aversion is analyzed by considering that the farmer simply de-
cides between protecting and not protecting his harvest. We formulate the model in a general 
form. 
 
Let K  be the value of portion of loss that the farmer is able to avoid by protecting the har-
vest, with a cost Kγ , where 0 1γ< < . We assume that the avoided loss is proportional to 
the total value of the harvest L , so K Lα= . Thus, 1α =  (and K L= ), if the farmer protects 
all the harvest, whereas 0α =  (and 0K = ), if he protects nothing. 
 
Hence, while the protect versus not to protect decision is analyzed, the chosen frame is the 
cost-loss traditional model, including two possible states (adverse weather 1θ =  or non ad-
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verse weather 0θ = ) and two possible actions for the farmer (protect, 1α = , or do not pro-
tect, 0α = ). The cost of protection is Lγ  and the total loss if there is no harvest is L. The 
payoff matrix is in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1 
Payoff Matrix 
 
 STATE OF NATURE 
 
ACTION 
Adverse weather 
 (θ = 1) 
Non adverse weather  
(θ = 0) 
Protect (α = 1) Lγ−  Lγ−  
Not protect (α = 0) L−  0 
 
 
In order to evaluate the risk influence over farmers decisions, and therefore to obtain the 
information value, we are going to analyze the decision considering the risk aversion, which 
provides one of the central analytical techniques in economic analysis ((Mas-Collel et al. 
(1995)). We assume that individual preferences can be represented by the expected utility 
with the utility function ( )U ⋅ , the CARA function (Constant Absolute Risk Aversion), being:  
{ }( ) expU x xρ= − − ,                      (1) 
where: x  is monetary gains and 0ρ >  is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aver-
sion, which is constant for this function. This is suitable for the farmer´s decision problem 
since the risk aversion does not depend on the harvest value. The optimal decision in this 
case is obtained maximizing the expected utility, which increases with the decrease of the 
expected expense. (That is the reason for writing the payoffs as negative monetary costs). 
 
 
 
2.2. SOLUTION AND THEORETICAL RESULTS 
Climatological information consists of a single probability of adverse weather 
{ }P r 1 ,Pθ θ= =  
usually deriving from historical weather records. From a Bayesian perspective, the parameter 
Pθ  can be viewed as the “prior probability” of adverse weather. 
 
As we study the case of a risk averse farmer whose utility function is given by (1), all the 
elements relevant for the decision problem, including the payoff values of the farmer in ac-
cordance with the utility function, are collected in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2 
Pθ  1 Pθ−   
STATE OF NATURE 
 Adverse weather Non adverse weather  
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ACTION  (θ = 1) (θ = 0) 
Protect (α = 1) { }exp Lργ−  { }exp Lργ−  
Not protect (α = 0) { }exp Lρ−  1−  
 
The optimal action to be chosen by the farmer in order to maximize the expected utility is 
given in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1 For the decision problem with risk, defined in Table 2, the optimal decision of 
the farmer considering the maximization of the expected utility criterion is  
• Protect (α = 1), if .A Pθ<  In this case the expected utility is { }(1) exp .EU Lργ= −  
• Do not protect (α=0), if .A Pθ>  In this case the expected utility is 
  { }(0) exp 1.EU P L Pθ θρ= − + −  
• Indifference between both actions if ,A Pθ=  
where 
{ }
{ }
1 exp
.
1 exp
L
A
L
ργ
ρ
−= −  
Proof  If protective action is taken (α = 1), then the expected utility of the farmer is: 
[ ] [ ] [ ] { }(1) (1 ) exp .EU PU L P U L U L Lθ θγ γ γ ργ= − + − − = − = −  
If protective action is not taken (α = 0), then the expected utility of the farmer is: 
[ ] [ ] { } { }
{ }
(0) (1 ) 0 exp (1 ) exp 0
exp 1.
EU PU L P U P L P
P L P
θ θ θ θ
θ θ
ρ
ρ
= − + − = − + − − =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
= − + −  
Therefore, to take protective action is strictly better if 
{ } { } { }{ }
1 exp
(1) (0) exp exp 1 ,
1 exp
L
EU EU L P L P P
Lθ θ θ
ργργ ρ ρ
−> ⇔ − > − + − ⇔ <−  
and in that case, the expected utility of the farmer is { }(1) exp .EU Lργ= −  
Similarly, not to protect (α = 0) is strictly better when (1) (0),EU EU<  and there is indifference 
between the two actions when (1) (0).EU EU= ■ 
 { }
{ }
1 exp
1 exp
L
A
L
ργ
ρ
−= −  being the probability threshold from which a farmer with constant absolute 
risk aversion and climatological information will protect the harvest from adverse weather, the 
optimal decision policy appears in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Optimal policy with climatological information and risk aversion 
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In the case of a risk neutral agent, it is optimal to protect the harvest whenever the cost per 
unit of loss to be avoided by protection is below the probability of suffering this loss (Murphy 
et. al., 1985), that is if .Pθγ <  In Proposition 2 it is proved that { }{ }
1 exp
1 exp
L
L
ργγ ρ
−> −  and there-
fore, it could happen that Pθ were in an interval, between A and γ . In that case, a risk ad-
verse agent (with constant absolute risk aversion) will prefer to protect the harvest, although 
it would not be optimal for him to protect it in the event that he were risk neutral, thus mini-
mizing the expected cost. Consequently, the risk adverse individual is more cautious and 
would take protection action in situations in which he would not take it if he were risk neutral. 
 
Proposition 2 The probability threshold values A and γ  from which a farmer with constant 
risk absolute aversion or risk neutrality, respectively, and climatological information will pro-
tect his harvest from adverse weather verify that A < ,γ  
where { }{ }
1 exp
.
1 exp
L
A
L
ργ
ρ
−= −  
Proof  As 
{ }
{ }
( )
( ) ( )
1
1 1
1 1
1 exp ! ! ,
1 exp
! !
i i i i
i i
i i
i i
L L
L i iA
L L L
i i
ργ ρ γγργ
ρ ρ ρ
−∞ ∞
= =
∞ ∞
= =
−−= = =− −
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
 we have that  
A γ< ⇔
( )
1
1
1
! 1
!
i i i
i
i
i
L
i
L
i
ρ γ
ρ
−∞
=
∞
=
<
∑
∑
( )1
1 1! !
ii i i
i i
LL
i i
ρρ γ −∞ ∞
= =
⇔ <∑ ∑ ⇔ ( )1
2 2
,
! !
ii i i
i i
LL
i i
ρρ γ −∞ ∞
= =
<∑ ∑  which is satisfied, because as 
1γ < , we have that 1 , 2,3,4....
! !
i i i i iL L i
i i
ρ γ ρ− < ∀ = . 
So, as always 1γ < , it is satisfied that { }{ }
1 exp
1 exp
L
L
ργγ ρ
−> −
, as we wanted to prove. ■ 
 
 
In Proposition 3 we prove three interesting properties of the probability threshold A from 
which a farmer with constant risk absolute aversion will protect the harvest from adverse 
weather. 
 
Proposition 3 { }{ }
1 exp
1 exp
L
A
L
ργ
ρ
−= −  satisfies the following properties: 
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(i) 0,Aγ
∂ >∂  
(ii) 0,Aρ
∂ ≤∂  
(iii) 
0
lim .Aρ γ→ =  
Proof  (i) 
{ }
{ }
exp
0.
1 exp
L LA
L
ργ ρ
γ ρ
−∂ = >∂ −  
 
{ } { } { } { }
{ } 2
exp 1 exp 1 exp exp
(ii) 0 0
1 exp
L L L L L LA A
L
ργ γ ρ ργ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
− − + −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦≤ ⇔ = ≤ ⇔∂ ∂ −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
{ } { } { } { }exp 1 exp 1 exp exp 0,L L L L L Lργ γ ρ ργ ρ⇔ − − + − ≤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦   
because { } 21 exp 0Lρ− >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , 
so { } { } { } { }0 1 exp exp exp 1 expA L L L Lργ ρ ργ ρ γρ
∂ ≤ ⇔ − ≤ − ⇔⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∂  
{ } { }
{ } { }
1 exp exp
1
1 exp exp
L L
L L
ρ ργ γ
ργ ρ
−⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⇔ ≤−⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
. 
Denoting 
{ } { }
{ } { }
1 exp exp
1 exp exp
L L
M
L L
ρ ργ γ
ργ ρ
−⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦= −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
, we have that 0 1A Mρ
∂ ≤ ⇔ ≤∂ . 
We can see that ( )1    0,1M γ≤ ∀ ∈ , because: 
• M is an increasing function of ( )0,1γ ∈ : 
In fact: { }
{ }
{ }
{ }
exp 1 exp
,   where  
exp 1 exp
L L
M A
A L L
ργ γ ργ
ρ ρ
−= = −  
So, A depends on γ . 
We know that A>0, and that 
{ }
{ }
exp
0
1 exp
L LA
L
ργ ρ
γ ρ
−∂ = >∂ − . 
So we have: 
{ } { } { } { } { }
{ } 2
exp exp exp exp exp
exp
AL L L A L L L
M
A L
ργ ργ ργ ρ ρ ργ γγ
γ ρ
⎡ ⎤∂+ −⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ∂∂ ⎣ ⎦= =∂ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
 
{ } { } { }
{ }
1exp exp exp
exp
AL L L L
A
A L
ργ ργ ργ ργ γγ
ρ
∂+ −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ∂= =  
{ }
{ }
exp
1
exp
L AL
A L A
ργ γργρ γ
⎡ ⎤∂= + −⎢ ⎥∂⎣ ⎦ . 
But as 0,  0< 1 and 0Lρ γ> < >  we have that  
{ } { }exp 0,   0 and exp 0.L A Lργ ρ> > >  
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We will see that 1 AL
A
γργ γ
⎡ ⎤∂+ −⎢ ⎥∂⎣ ⎦ is also positive: 
{ }
{ }
{ }
{ }
1 exp exp
1 1
1 exp 1 exp
L L LAL L
A L L
ρ ργ ργργ ργ γγ ργ ρ
−⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤∂ ⎣ ⎦+ − = + + =⎢ ⎥∂ − −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
 { }
{ }
{ } { } { }
{ }
exp 1 exp exp exp
1
1 exp 1 exp
L L L L L L L L
L
L L
ργ ργ ργ ργ ργ ργ ργ ργργ ργ ργ
− + − += + + = =− −
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
1 2
1 1
! !
0.
! !
i i
i i
i i
i i
L L
L
i i
L L
i i
ργ ργργ
ργ ργ
∞ ∞
= =
∞ ∞
= =
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦= = >⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
 
• In addition, we can see that if 1 1Mγ = ⇒ = . 
M being an increasing function of γ , and M = 1 when 1γ = , we have that 1M ≤ . 
So, 1 0AM ρ
∂≤ ⇒ ≤∂ , as we wanted to prove. 
(iii) 
{ }
{ }
{ }
{ }
{ }
{ }0 0 0 0
1 exp exp exp
lim lim lim lim .
1 exp exp exp
L L L L
A
L L L Lρ ρ ρ ρ
ργ γ ργ γ ργ γρ ρ ρ→ → → →
− −= = = =− − ■ 
 
In accordance with (i) in Proposition 3, the greater the cost to protect the harvest, the smaller 
the caution of the farmer. In (ii) we see that the greater the risk aversion, the smaller the 
probability threshold from which the agent protects the harvest. If the producer is highly ad-
verse to the risk ( ρ  is very high), he will maximize his expected utility by protecting the har-
vest from adverse weather (making sure it will not suffer the loss if the weather is adverse) 
although the associated probability of that adverse situation ( Pθ ), is small. In (iii) we see that 
the behaviour of a farmer whose risk aversion tends to zero is similar to that of a risk neutral 
agent. 
 
Example 1 In Table 3 it can be seen how propositions 2 and 3 apply for 1L =  and for pa-
rameters  and γ ρ  taking different values. The entries of the matrix correspond to the values 
of the thres-hold value A. 
 
If for example 0.45Pθ =  and 0,5,γ =  the risk neutral farmer does not protect. The risk 
averse farmer (with CARA function) does not protect if 0,01ρ =  or 0.1  but protects if 
0.5, 0.8, 1 or 5,ρ =  according to the values given in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
 0.01ρ =  0.1ρ =  0.5ρ =  0.8ρ =  1ρ =  5ρ =  
0.1γ =  0.099  0.099  0.079  0.068  0.061  0.004  
0.3γ =  0.299  0.290  0.249  0.221  0.204  0.024  
0.5γ =  0.499  0.488  0.438  0.401  0.378  0.076  
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0.7γ =  0.699  0.689  0.646  0.613  0.590  0.218  
0.8γ =  0.799  0.792  0.758  0.731  0.713  0.364  
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3. Imperfect Information 
As in Murphy et. al. (1985), we consider the incorporation of additional information to the 
model. It is introduced as an imperfect weather forecasting from a meteorological office. The 
goal is to obtain the optimal decision rule in this context and also to quantify the economic 
value of such a forecasting system, considering the information value as the benefits of 
changing the farmer´s behavior when he has this additional information available. 
 
Let the random variable Z which indicates a forecast of adverse weather ( )1Z = , or of non 
adverse weather ( )0Z = be introduced. The conditional probabilities of adverse weather are 
denoted by { }1 =Pr 1/ 1P Zθ = =   and  { }0 =Pr 1/ 0 .P Zθ = =  In addition, as in Murphy et al. 
(1985) it is assumed that { } { }Pr 1 Pr 1 PZ θθ= = = = , that is, the forecasting system produces 
adverse weather signals with the same probability that adverse weather events take place. 
Without loss of genera-lity, 10 10 ≤≤≤≤ PPP θ , is also assumed. In these conditions it is 
easily obtained that 
( )
( )10
1
.
1
P P
P
P
θ
θ
−= −  * 
For the case of a risk averse farmer whose utility function is given by (1), all the elements 
relevant for the decision problem with imperfect information, in the context we have just de-
fined are collected in Table 4. 
The quality of information is defined in terms of the following index:  
1( )( , )
(1 )
P Pq Corr Z
P
θ
θ
θ −= = − . 
The value of information is defined as 
 
V= Value of information = EU (with forecas-ting) – EU (without forecasting), 
 
where EU is the value of the expected utility corresponding to the optimal decision in both 
cases (with and without forecasting). Specifically, EU(without forecasting) is the correspond-
ing value obtained in Proposition 1.  
 
EU (with forecasting) = EU (Z = 1) Pr {Z = 1} + EU (Z = 0) Pr {Z = 0} 
 
it is the ex-ante expected utility with forecasting. 
It is interesting to obtain the value of information as a function of the quality of information q.
 
 
 Table 4 
Payoff Matrix with imperfect information 
 If   1Z =  If   0Z =  
 1P  11 P−  0P  01 P−  
 STATE OF NATURE STATE OF NATURE 
ACTION 1θ =  0θ =  1θ =  0θ =  
1α =  { }exp Lργ−  { }exp Lργ−  { }exp Lργ−  { }exp Lργ−  
0α =  { }exp Lρ−  1−  { }exp Lρ−  1−  
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* { } { } { } { } { } ( ) ( )11 0 0 1Pr 1 Pr 1/ 1 Pr 1 Pr 1/ 0 Pr 0 1 .1
P P
P Z Z Z Z P P P P P
P
θ
θ θ θ
θ
θ θ θ −= = = = = = + = = = = + − ⇒ = −
 
In order to obtain the optimal decision rule of the farmer and also the value of the information 
we need to distinguish between two cases, as the expected utility of the optimal decision 
without forecasting enters in the calculation of the value of information.   
 
 
 
3.1 CASE IN WHICH 0 .A Pθ< ≤  
As has been proved in Proposition 1, where ,A Pθ≤  if we consider a situation without fore-
casting (that is only climatological information is used), the optimal decision of the farmer is 
to protect and then ( ) { }without forecasting exp .EU Lργ= −   
 
In the following proposition the optimal action to be chosen by the farmer in order to maxi-
mize the expected utility in the case of incomplete information, as well as the value of infor-
mation for this case are obtained. 
 
Proposition 4  For the decision problem with risk and  incomplete information, defined in 
Table 4, assuming that 0 ,A Pθ< ≤  the optimal decision of the farmer considering the maxi-
mization of the expected utility criterion is: 
• If 0 ,A P<  to protect, whatever the signal is, and then the expected utility is 
{ }exp .Lργ−  
• If 0 ,If A P>  to protect if Z = 1 (the expected utility being { }exp )Lργ− and not 
protect if Z = 0 (the expected utility being { }0 0exp 1).P L Pρ− + −  
• Indifference between both actions if A = 0 .P  
The value of information is 
{ } { }
{ }
*
*
0,        if  
(1 ) exp 1 (1 ) 1 exp( )
                                    (1 ) 1 exp ,         if  
A
A
q q
P L P P LV q
q P P L q q
θ θ θ
θ θ
ργ ρ
ρ
⎧ ≤⎪⎪ − − + − − −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= ⎨ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎪ − − − >⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎣ ⎦⎩
 
where * 1 .A
Aq
Pθ
= −  
Proof   Since the variable Z has two possible values, we have the following possibilities: 
If 1Z = , as 1P Pθ≥ , then 1A P≤ , so the optimal decision is to protect and the expected utility 
is equal to: { }exp Lργ− . 
If  0,Z =  as 0P Pθ≤ , there are two more possibilities: 
(i) 0A P< . In that case, the optimal decision is to protect and the expected utility is 
also equal to { }exp Lργ− . 
(ii) 0A P> , where not to protect is optimal, with an expected utility of: 
{ }0 0exp (1 )P L Pρ− − − . 
If 0A P= , the agent is indifferent between the two possible actions. 
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So, if 0A P< , the optimal decision is to protect if the information is 1Z =  and also to protect if 
the information is 0Z = , with the same expected utility that the farmer achieves without the 
forecasting system. So, in this case, meteorological information has no value because it does 
not affect the decision making. 
If 0A P> , the optimal decision is different depending on the received information.  
If 1Z = , the optimal decision is to protect and the expected utility is { }exp Lργ− . If 0Z =  , 
the optimal decision is not to protect and ex-ante expected utility is: 
{ } { }(with forecasting) ( 1) Pr 1 ( 0) Pr 0EU EU Z Z EU Z Z= = = + = = =
{ } { }0 0exp (1 ) exp (1 ) .P L P P L Pθ θργ ρ= − + − − − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
Accordingly, with 0 A Pθ< ≤ , and constant absolute risk aversion, meteorological information 
has positive economic value if and only if 0A P> . In this case, the economic value of the in-
formation, ( )V q , is: 
{ } { }
0
0 0
0,
( )
(1 )exp (1 ) 1 1 exp ,
if A P
V q
P L P P L if A Pθ θργ ρ
≤⎧⎪= ⎨ ⎡ ⎤− − − − − >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎣ ⎦⎩
 
Considering the information quality index 1
( )
(1 )
P Pq
P
θ
θ
−= − , and the probabilities relation 
1
0
(1 )
(1 )
P PP
P
θ
θ
−= − , the information has economic value if and only if: 
 
( )
0
(1 1 )
1
(1 )
q P P P AA P A q
P P
θ θ θ
θ θ
− − +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦> ⇔ > ⇔ > −− . 
Denoting: *  =1A
Aq
Pθ
− , the economic value is positive if and only if *Aq q> .  
The economic value of the meteorological information can be expressed as a function of the 
quality index: 
{ } { }
{ }
*
*
0,        if  
(1 ) exp 1 (1 ) 1 exp( )
                                    (1 ) 1 exp ,         if  
A
A
q q
P L P P LV q
q P P L q q
θ θ θ
θ θ
ργ ρ
ρ
⎧ ≤⎪⎪ − − + − − −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= ⎨ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎪ − − − >⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎣ ⎦⎩
 
■  
 
There is a threshold, * ,Aq   below which the forecast system does not improve the farmer´s 
expected utility. This threshold increases with the absolute risk aversion coefficient of Arrow-
Pratt ρ . So, with a more risk averse agent the information quality needed to influence his 
decision making is higher. 
 
In fact, 
* * 1A Aq q A A
A Pθρ ρ ρ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= = −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ , where 0
A
ρ
∂ ≤∂ , as has been shown in Proposition 3, so 
necessarily: 
*
0A
q
ρ
∂ ≥∂ . The larger is the risk aversion, the higher is the quality threshold 
* .Aq  This result can appear as paradoxical, but it is comprehensible that a highly risk averse 
farmer will not change the decision of protecting his harvest (obtaining a certain result), 
unless the information quality is very high. 
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In the *Aq q>  interval, it is satisfied that 
( ) { }( ) 1 1 exp 0V q P P Lθ θ ρ′ = − − − >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , 
so we have that ( )V q is strictly increasing throughout that interval. 
 
To see how the information value depends on the absolute risk aversion coefficient ρ , when 
*
Aq q> , we have: 
 
{ } { } { }( ) (1 )exp (1 ) exp (1 ) exp 0V q L P L P P L L qP P L Lθ θ θ θ θγ ργ ρ ρρ
∂ = − − − + − > ⇔∂  
( ){ } (1 )exp 1 q PL θρ γ γ−⇔ − > .  
That is, the value increases with ρ  when { }{ }
exp
1
exp
L
q
P Lθ
ργγ
ρ> − , and decreases below this 
level of quality. This is due to the fact that the threshold *Aq increases with the risk aversion 
coefficient ρ , causing the information value changes to be zero when the risk aversion be-
comes higher nearby *  Aq . However, as we have seen, if the information quality is over that 
critical region (which happens if it exceeds the level 
{ }
{ }
exp
1
exp
L
q
P Lθ
ργγ
ρ= − ) is more valuable 
when the risk aversion is high.  
 
Example 2 Let us consider the following values for the parameters: 0.3γ = , 1L = , 0.4P =  
and ρ  taking the values 0.1, 0.5 or 0.9. 
 
For 0.1ρ =  it is obtained that *0.289 and 0.034.AA q= =  
 
For 0.5ρ = , the corresponding values are *0.249 and 0.168.AA q= =  
 
For 0.9ρ = , *0.212 and 0.292AA q= =  are obtained. 
 
In Figure 2 the critical region can be observed due to changes on the quality threshold from 
which individual decisions with an imperfect forecast are different to those in the case of sim-
ple climatological information; and how over this region, the information value increases with 
the risk aversion coefficient. 
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Figure 2 
Quality-value curve for different values of ρ , where 0.3γ = , 1L =  , and 0.4Pθ =  
Information value with different risk aversion 
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3.2 CASE IN WHICH .A Pθ>  
As has been proved in Proposition 1, when A Pθ> , the optimal decision in a situation without 
forecasting (using just climatological information) is do not protect and then 
( ) { }without forecasting exp 1.EU P L Pθ θρ= − + −
 
Proposition 5  For the decision problem with risk and  incomplete information, defined in 
Table 4, assuming that ,P Aθ <  the optimal decision of the farmer considering the maximiza-
tion of the expected utility criterion is: 
• If 1 ,A P>  do not protect, whatever  the signal is. 
•  1 ,If A P<  to protect if Z = 1 (the expected utility being { }exp )Lργ− and do 
not protect if Z = 0 (the expected utility being { }0 0exp 1).P L Pρ− + −  
• Indifference between both actions if A = 1.P  
The value of information is 
{ } { } { }
{ }
*
*
0,        if  
exp exp (1 ) 1 exp( )
                                    (1 ) 1 exp ,         if  
B
B
q q
P L L P P LV q
q P P L q q
θ θ θ
θ θ
ρ ργ ρ
ρ
⎧ ≤⎪⎪ − + − − −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= ⎨ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎪ − − − >⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎣ ⎦⎩
 
where * .
1B
A P
q
P
θ
θ
−= −  
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Proof  If the signal received is 0,Z =  as 0 ,A P Pθ> ≥  the optimal decision is not to protect 
and the corresponding expected utility is { }0 0exp 1.P L Pρ− + −  
 
If the signal is 1,Z =  as 1 ,P Pθ ≤  there are two possibilities: 
 (i) 1 ,A P< in which case the optimal decision is to protect and the expected utility is 
{ }exp .Lργ−  
 (ii) 1 ,A P> in which case the optimal decision is not to protect and the expected utility 
is { } ( )1 1exp 1 .P L Pρ− − −  
If  1A P=  the agent is indifferent between the two possible actions. 
Therefore, if 1 ,A P>  it is optimal not to protect, whatever the signal is, and the meteorologi-
cal information has no value. If  1 ,A P<  it is optimal to protect if the signal is 1,Z =  (the ex-
pected utility being { }exp )Lργ−  and not to protect if Z = 0 (the expected utility being 
{ }0 0exp 1).P L Pρ− + −   
Assuming 1 ,A P< { } { }(with forecasting) ( 1)Pr 1 ( 0)Pr 0EU EU Z Z EU Z Z= = = + = = =  
{ } { }
{ } { } { }
0 0exp (1 ) exp (1 )
exp (1 ) exp 1 (1 ) exp 1 .
P L P P L P
P L q P P L P P L P
θ θ
θ θ θ θ θ θ
ργ ρ
ργ ρ ρ
= − + − − − − =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
= − + − − − − + −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
The value of the meteorological information is zero if  
( ) ( )1 1 1 .1
A P
A P A P q P q P A P q
P
θ
θ θ θ θ
θ
−≥ ⇔ ≥ + − ⇔ − ≤ − ⇔ ≤ −  
As by definition  
( )( ) (with forecasting) without forecasting ,V q EU EU= −  
substituting the expressions for the expected utilities the final expression for the value of in-
formation is obtained. ■ 
 
In this case we have: 
* * 1 0,
1
B Bq q A A
A Pθρ ρ ρ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= = ≤∂ ∂ ∂ − ∂   
because 
1 0
1 Pθ
>−  and 0.
A
ρ
∂ ≤∂  
Therefore, the larger is the risk aversion, the smaller is the quality threshold * .Bq  This result is 
reasonable, taking into account that when ,A Pθ>  the optimal decision with simple clima-
tological information is not to protect. Then, the larger is the risk aversion of the farmer, the 
smaller are the conditions for a change to protection. 
 
In the *Bq q>  interval, it is satisfied that 
( ) { }( ) 1 1 exp 0,V q P P Lθ θ ρ′ = − − − >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
so we have that, as in the previous case, ( )V q  is stricly increasing throuhout that interval. 
 
In the *Bq q>  interval, we have 
  21
{ }( ) (1 ) exp 0.dV q P P L L
d θ θ
ρρ
′ = − >  
Therefore in this case, if 1 2 ,ρ ρ>  for * ,Bq q> the value of the information ( )V q  correspond-
ing to 1ρ  is always larger than the value of the information ( )V q  corresponding to 2 .ρ  
 
 
Example 3 Let us consider the following values for the parameters: 0.3γ = , 1L = , 0.2P =  
and ρ  taking the values 0.1, 0.5 or 0.9. 
For 0.1ρ =  it is obtained that *0.289 and 0.111.BA q= =  
For 0.5,ρ = *0.249 and 0.061.BA q= =  
For 0.9ρ = , *0.212 and 0.015BA q= =  are obtained. 
 
In Figure 3 the quality-value curves for the different values of ρ  are plotted. 
 
Figure 3 
Quality-value curve for different values of ρ , where 0.3γ = , 1L =  , and 0.2Pθ =  
Information value with different risk aversion 
coefficients
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4. Conclusions 
In this paper, the optimal decision of a farmer whose preferences are represented by a 
CARA utility function is obtained, in the context of cost-loss decision models under risk. The 
introduction of risk aversion changes the behavior of the farmer. The case of climatological 
information and also the case in which there is additional  meteorological information are 
studied. A positive relation between the information value and risk aversion has been under-
lined, so considering neutral agents in the type of decisions analyzed underestimates the 
value of meteorological information. 
 
However, the information has zero economic value below a quality threshold, which is higher 
in the case of risk aversion, at least in certain important cases. So, evaluating the relevance 
of a higher quality information system, we conclude that a forecast system whose quality is 
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very low, does not offer an added value for the decision making with respect to the simple 
statistical or historical information (that is climatological information). Accordingly, an im-
provement in the information quality highly increases its worth in all cases, if it improves the 
level in which the farmers take it into account when making their decisions. 
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